Knowledge and information

At this point, it is important to clarify some terms and to spend a little time on two very important and rather confusing terms - knowledge A complex construction of information and individual experience with an interrelatedsocial and environmental dimension. (N.B. many different interpretations of knowledgeexist, and this is one preferred in this Toolkit) and information a source of data or sensory input, organized or arranged into a pattern which can be interpreted.. (A glossary of key terms can also be found on page 14).

 

Schools of thought about knowing

Theories of knowledge, and the way in which knowledge is examined, interpreted and understood may depend on the perspective of the individual person. This perspective refers to that person’s belief in a set of rules, values or theories. When investigating knowledge and the nature of knowledge, individuals will use an approach that is based on the perspectives they hold. This approach will give rise to the use of appropriate methodologies, or sets of methods, arranged in a sequence depending on the approach adopted.

 

One theoretical perspective, for example, is that knowledge exists as an object and can be objectively observed and classified. This perspective is known as ‘positivism’. Positivists see the use of scientific methods as highly desirable, and favour quantitative descriptions of events. A trainer who has adopted a ‘positivist’ perspective would therefore be more likely to use a quantitative approach when trying to investigate the existing knowledge of a group or of an individual, and utilize methods such as questionnaires or structured interviews when identifying training needs.

 

An alternative and very different theoretical perspective is based on the idea that knowledge does not exist in an objective a statement of what a learner is expected to learn by the end of a training course,expressed in terms which are specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-bound., quantifiable form, but that a learner actively constructs both the knowledge acquired and the strategies used to acquire it. From this ‘constructivist’ perspective, it appears that there is no one ‘knowledge’, since it is constantly changing and evolving. Knowledge is different not only between individuals, but also within an individual from one moment to the next. A trainer who has adopted a constructivist perspective would be more likely therefore to adopt a qualitative approach when trying to investigate the existing knowledge of a group or of an individual, and use methods such as semi- or unstructured interviews, or observations when identifying training needs.

 

Concepts of knowledge

The concept of ‘knowledge’ is very complex. There are several different ways of knowing. Knowing people is different from knowing things or truths, and these again are different from knowing oneself. Academic knowledge (book knowledge) is often different from practical or experiential knowledge.

 

Not all knowledge is held with the same sense of certainty, and may need to be tested further.  The distinguishing line between a theory and knowledge is very thin. We may think we know something, but we cannot be sure until we have tested it out in practice. Even strongly held knowledge turns out only to be a belief when it runs against contrary experience. Knowledge which has been tested time and again against experience will be held firmly. This is why the experience of adults is so vital in the learning process. Experience, therefore, is a vital part of knowing. Practical experiential knowledge is different from ‘head’ knowledge or ‘book’ knowledge. Some people think that one has only effectively learned something when one has practised or used the knowledge, not when one can recite the knowledge (Rogers and Taylor 1998).

 

Types of knowledge

Some scientists who hold a ‘reductionist’ perspective (which means that everything that exists in the world can be reduced or broken down into smaller parts and analysed) believe that knowledge can be isolated and examined objectively. For this reason, pure scientific knowledge is often considered as a higher form of knowledge than applied science; practical or technical knowledge is thought to be of an even lower form. ‘Experiential’ knowledge, for example the knowledge of poor farmers who have never attended school, or the knowledge of young children, may be dismissed altogether as irrelevant.

 

Bawden (1990) suggests that there are three types of knowledge; knowing for the purpose of knowing, knowing for the purpose of doing, and knowing for the purpose of being. This last type of knowledge, sometimes called, ‘praxis’, or ‘learning to be’, is a very important concept. It moves beyond thinking of knowledge as something which exists as an object. Instead, knowledge is treated as something which is created by every individual, and must therefore be treated as unique to each person. This means that it is impossible for us to think of knowledge as an examinable object, existing as a distinct entity. The reality (if such a thing exists) is much more complex. In fact, we might say that there are an infinite number of knowledges, since the knowledge of each individual will be different. These concepts may seem abstract, but they are of vital importance to a trainer, because it is by understanding the nature of knowledge that learning can be facilitated effectively in groups and individuals.

 

As Röling and Engel (1991) state:

 

‘Knowledge occurs between the ears, a property of the mind. It cannot be heard, seen or touched...People use knowledge to operate in the real world. They build theories that attribute causes to effects and apply these to control the environment for their purposes. If things do not turn out as predicted, they adapt their knowledge or ignore the real world to avoid inconsistency. Knowledge utilization is a mechanism for survival.’

 

Knowledge, from this perspective, cannot be transmitted; it is the personal property of an individual.

 

Rural peoples’ knowledge

For many years, it was thought that scientific knowledge was ‘correct’ and was the answer to solving the ‘problems’ of rural people, as perceived by those outside the rural communities. Scientists and experts decided on a solution to a problem, normally through research, and attempted to persuade farmers to change their practices through extension. This approach was often termed ‘transfer of technology’. More recently, since the late 1970’s the emphasis has been transferred towards the farmer as a possessor of ‘Indigenous Technical Knowledge’, or ITK Indigenous Technical Knowledge as it is commonly known.

 

‘Proponents of this populist approach emphasize the rational nature and sophistication of rural people’s knowledge and believe that knowledge can be blended with or incorporated into formal scientific knowledge systems.’

(Scoones and Thompson 1994)

 

There is now a movement beyond this, which has occurred because of the realization that knowledge is of an individual construction and is dependant on the relationships between individuals in a society and the knowledge they possess. Therefore, the term ‘rural people’s knowledge’ (RPK Rural People’s Knowledge) has been coined:

 

‘...in recent years this perspective (ITK) has been expanded to consider indigenous knowledge as cultural knowledge, producing and reproducing mutual understanding and identity among the members of a farming community where local technical knowledge, skills and capacities are inextricably linked to non-technical ones (i.e. cultural , ecological and sociological factors). In this way, ‘ITK’ becomes ‘RPK’. 

(Scoones and Thompson 1994)

 

This movement from a ‘farmer first’ approach to ‘beyond farmer first’, therefore takes into consideration that one type of knowledge does not exist in isolation, but rather as a very complex system. This has been termed a ‘knowledge and information system’ or KIS Knowledge and Information System (Röling and Engels 1991).

 

Information

Röling and Engel (1991) define information as:

 

sensory input that maintains or improves the goodness-of-fit between knowledge and the real world. On the one hand, information is explicit, visible, touchable, hearable and this is transferable. It consists of matter and energy. On the other, information assumes that a receiver can impose a pattern upon this matter/energy so that it takes on meaning and makes sense. Information, therefore, is more than data or mere sensory input. It also implies an interpretable pattern. Information must not only anticipate its receiver’s ability to interpret it, but, to be informative, it must also anticipate upon an existing discrepancy between the receiver’s knowledge and the environment. Deliberate information provision through communication must pay considerable attention to anticipation.’

 

According to their concept, information plays a key role in the construction of knowledge, and the way in which individuals relate  to the world. Information may change their view of the world, and hence cause them to ‘reconstruct’ their knowledge.


Information can be introduced externally to community members in several different ways such as through personal communication, group activities, and mass media. Traditional extension approaches, particularly ‘transfer of technology’, focus on the presentation of technological information in the hope that people will be persuaded to adopt it. This view of the role of information has now been re-addressed, recognizing that many potent sources of information actually originate within rural communities. This idea is reinforced by the fact that information is transferred internally in every society through a wide range of means, some intentional and some incidental.

 

Alternative views of knowledge and information

Leeuwis, Long and Villareal (1991) find three problems with the concept of knowledge being the ‘property’ of the individual, the total of which may add up to a sum of knowledge in a community, functioning in a systematic way.

 

Firstly, they argue that knowledge is a social construct; ‘knowledge processes can only be properly understood if one recognizes their socially-constructed and emergent character’. This means that knowledge should not be differentiated into ‘types’, but will by nature be of a social construction, ‘jointly created through encounters between knowing and active subjects’.

 

Secondly, they suggest that knowledge and information are not separable, as ‘both are in fact elements of a single interpretative process, since information has no meaning if it cannot be internalized, and by being internalized, it becomes part of a stock of knowledge’. It is not enough to regard knowledge or information as a body of individual cognitive construction, or made up of items of data that can simply be transferred from one person or another.

Thirdly, it is put forward, that there is no ‘real world’, which exists and can be observed as a distinct entity by an observer, since the interpretation and perception of any situation will depend on the sets of subjective perceptions and evaluations of particular social actors, and potentially conflicting social and normative actors. Knowledge is only meaningful when the ‘agency’ of actors is considered, i.e. what they do in the particular social context in which they operate.

 

Power structures in a community also become of very great importance because of the complex networks of different actors and institutions, knowledge transmission varies throughout these networks. Scoones and Thompson (1994) state that ‘knowledge is not evenly distributed’.

 

The debate about knowledge will (and should) continue in the future. One example of current thinking about knowledge is formulated by Röling (2000).

 

‘The exciting thing that is happening is that a totally new additional area of science professionalism  is emerging. This professionalism is based on the assumption that ‘knowledge is effective action in the domain of existence’ (Maturana and Varela 1987), and not the accumulation of a store of objective truths. When it comes to designing effective action in the domain of existence, pure science has an important role, but in addition, we have to deal with people’s objectives and opinions as ‘extended facts’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993), and with shared cognitions, intentionality, and institutions as essential design ingredients. In such design, people are not objects that can be instrumentally or even strategically manipulated. They must participate. The design must be interactive’